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Abstract
In this paper, we report findings from a  comparative  study  of  factors  that  influence  the
learning process that underlies entrepreneurial innovation, as entrepreneurs move  from  an  initial
intuition to  a  well-developed  new  product  or  service.  Evidence  from  our  comparative  study
highlights the self-reinforcing  effect  of  prior  related  knowledge,  perceived  incentives  and  the
degree  of  control  on  the  allocation  of  entrepreneurs’  limited  time,  attention   and   resources.
Combining theory and evidence from our study, we propose an interpretative model that  suggests
that innovation  in  entrepreneurial  ventures  rests  on  self-reinforcing  learning  cycles  that  lead
entrepreneurs to dedicate increasing  resources  to  the  exploration  of  some  opportunities  at  the
expense of others, following a sensemaking  process  affected  by  their  previous  knowledge  and
their degree of involvement in the projects.   
1. Executive Summary
Most literature  on  entrepreneurship  emphasizes  the  discovery  of  opportunities
and  the  decision  to  exploit  them  as   the   essence   of   entrepreneurial   action.
Entrepreneurs are  usually  depicted  as  sagacious  pursuer  of  opportunities  and
bold risk takers. This  representation,  however,  neglects  a  fundamental  learning
process, which takes  place  as  entrepreneurs  develop  an  initial  intuition  into  a
successful new product or service. Successful entrepreneurial innovation,  in  fact,
requires more than the capacity to discern an opportunity for entrepreneurial profit
and the willingness to accept the associated  risk.  Entrepreneurs  often  deal  with
new  and  ill-defined  product  concepts,  whose  context   of   use   is   still   poorly
understood and whose commercial applications are  not  fully  explored  yet.  Many
business opportunities appear in very rough  intuitive  form,  and  require  a  search  for  additional
information before their  feasibility  and  profitability  can  be  reasonably  assessed.  Between  the
recognition  of  an  opportunity  and  its   successful   exploitation,   lies   a   critical,   albeit   often
underestimated, learning process  that  takes  place  as  entrepreneurs  gradually  manage  to  make
sense  of  the  connections  between  the  different  technologies,   product   functions,   customers’
preferences, market structure, etc. 
While learning is intrinsic to any type of innovation,  learning  in  entrepreneurial  ventures
usually takes place in particularly  adverse  conditions.  First,  entrepreneurs  tend  to  face  a  high
degree of ambiguity, as they search for solutions for problems that are still imperfectly defined, as
they explore applications of  new  technologies  that  are  not  fully  developed,  and  as  they  take
guesses   about   which   opportunities   are   worth   pursuing.    Second,    the    development    of
entrepreneurial ideas requires contributions of a different  nature  from  a  range  of  actors,  whose
knowledge and skills are complementary to the entrepreneurs’. Typically, entrepreneurs possess  a
good  knowledge  of  the  market  and  the  customers,  and  often  a  certain  degree   of   technical
competence in his field. However, the  actual  realization  of  their  ideas  often  requires  not  only
financial  resources,  but  also  skills  and  competencies  that  must  be  obtained  from  industrial,
commercial and research partners,  consultants,  designers,  etc.  Finally,  entrepreneurial  ventures
tend to suffer from a relatively high scarcity of money, time and attention. These constraints affect
entrepreneurial learning, imposing periodic choices about the continuation  or  the  termination  of
developmental efforts.
Our research explores how these constraints affect  the  learning  process  of  entrepreneurs
engaged in developmental efforts. Evidence from our study suggests  that  success  and  failure  of
entrepreneurial innovation may be  affected  by  virtuous  (or  vicious)  circles,  which  may  bring
entrepreneurs to dedicate more and more time,  attention  and  resources  to  some  projects  at  the
expense of others. A solid related knowledge base  and  a  deep  involvement  in  all  the  activities
where critical learning takes place are fundamental in reinforcing  the  capacity  to  play  a  pivotal
role and to assess the potential “return on the learning investment” – i.e. the expected  commercial
return of the time and resources dedicated to the project. In absence of a  related  knowledge  base,
entrepreneurs may eventually be forced to abdicate their leading role in the  development  process,
and gradually lose the capacity to assess the levels of risk and return associated to  the  completion
of the project. In this respect, our findings seem to discourage from initiating  explorative  venture
whose  technological  platforms  are  distant  from   the   entrepreneurs’   core   technological   and
scientific domains.
In  summary,  mastering  the  critical  knowledge  platforms  required  for   the   successful
development of the new product or service affects learning in entrepreneurial innovation  as  (i)  it
allows entrepreneurs to preserve  a  leading  role  in  coordinating  collective  contributions,  (ii)  it
improves the entrepreneurs’ capacity to make sense of the tasks ahead, and  therefore  it  increases
their control over the process, (iii)  it  facilitates  an  assessment  of  the  potential  risk  and  return
associated with the initiative, (iv) it prevents  a  loss  of  confidence,  due  to  personal  rather  than
objective  reasons,  and  (v)  it  helps  capture  newly  created  knowledge,  further  upgrading   the
knowledge base of the entrepreneurs.
2. Introduction
Research on learning processes in  entrepreneurial  ventures  is  still  in  an  early  stage  (Agnedal,
1999;   Minniti   and   Bygrave,   2001).   Although   the   importance   of   learning   processes   in
discriminating successful ventures from unsuccessful ones is widely  acknowledged  (e.g.  Ireland,
Hitt, Camp and Sexton, 2001; Nicholls-Nixon, Cooper and Woo, 2000), empirical studies are  still
rare. Past studies of entrepreneurial cognition tended to focus on  issues  such  as  risk  taking  (i.e.
Brockhaus, 1980; Begley and Boyd, 1987; Brockhaus and Horowitz, 1986; Simon, Houghton  and
Savelli, 2003) or opportunity recognition (i.e. Palich and Bagby, 1995; Shane, 2000). The learning
processes that occur as entrepreneurs accumulate and organize knowledge and information  within
(i.e. Van de Ven and Polley, 1992; McGrath, 1995) and across developmental efforts (Minniti and
Bygrave, 2001), however, are still underexplored phenomena.
From a cognitive point of view, entrepreneurial innovation can be conceived  as  a  process
of building and refining a set of knowledge structures – technologies, routines, interpretations  etc.
– that transform an initial intuition into a viable new product or service, a new production  process
or a new way to serve the market (Schumpeter, 1934). In this  paper,  we  investigate  the  learning
process that underlies the successful generation and integration  of  knowledge  in  entrepreneurial
ventures, as new combinations of resources are being explored and the  potential  risk  and  returns
of the venture are gradually made sense of (Van de Ven and Polley, 1992).
A review of past research indicates that three contextual conditions may affect  learning  in
entrepreneurial   ventures.   First,   although   the   exploitation   of   existing   resources   and   the
optimization of current combinations are essential for the long-term prosperity of the firm, what is
central to entrepreneurial action is the exploration of new possibilities, the experimentation of new
ideas  (Schumpeter,  1936).  As  such,  entrepreneurs  usually  face  a  high  degree  of   ambiguity,
conceived as imperfect knowledge of the connection between means and ends (Garud and Van  de
Ven,  1992).  Second,  entrepreneurs  tend  to  pursue  business  opportunities   regardless   of   the
resources   they   actually   control   (Stevenson   and   Gumpert,   1985).   The    development    of
entrepreneurial ideas often requires contributions  of  a  different  nature  from  a  range  of  actors,
whose knowledge and skills are complementary to the entrepreneurs’ (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986;
Birley, 1985; Larson, 1991). This means  also  that  entrepreneurs  may  need  to  rely  on  external
assistance as they evaluate  the  feasibility  and  profitability  of  a  business  opportunity.  Finally,
entrepreneurial ventures tend to suffer from a relatively high scarcity of resources, related not only
to the small stock of financial and physical resources on which the venture relies (Kirchoff,  1994;
Garnsey, 1998), but also  to  the  limits  to  the  time  available  to  and  the  attention  span  of  the
entrepreneur (Garud and Van de  Ven,  1992;  Gifford,  1998).  Consequently,  entrepreneurs  may
periodically be required to decide  what  opportunities  are  worth  exploring  and  whether  certain
development projects should be continued or terminated. Investigation of entrepreneurial learning,
therefore, should at least partially account for how ambiguity, outside assistance  and  shortage  of
resources affect the process as entrepreneurs move from an  initial  intuition  to  a  well-developed
and integrated set of knowledge structures that constitute and support a new product or service. 
Our research relied on a comparative analysis of  two  technology-development  projects  –
one successful and one unsuccessful – run by the same entrepreneur at about the  same  time.  The
adoption  of  a  rich,  qualitative  method  for  data  collection  and  analysis  was  justified  by  the
exploratory nature of the study (Yin, 1989; Lee, 1998), and by the focus  on  the  learning  process
that underlies successful innovation (Van de Ven  and  Polley,  1992;  Miner  and  Mezias,  1996).
Evidence  from  our  study  highlights  the  self-reinforcing  effect  of   prior   related   knowledge,
perceived  incentives  and  the  degree  of  control  on  the  process  on  the   commitment   of   the
entrepreneur and on the consequent allocation of time, attention and resources. 
We believe that the contribution of our paper is  threefold.  First,  our  paper  presents  first
evidence of some conditions that affect the successful development and refinement  of  knowledge
in developmental efforts.  A  rich  description  and  a  longitudinal  analysis  helped  us  uncover  a
number  of  variables  and  produce  an  explanatory  framework  that  may  be  later  subjected   to
empirical   test.   Second,   our   interpretative   model   addresses   a   fundamental   issue   in    an
entrepreneurial setting: the need to distribute time  and  attention  between  different  opportunities
and different projects. Our model suggests  that  these  decisions  are  affected  by  self-reinforcing
learning  processes  that  lead  entrepreneurs  to  dedicate  increasing  time  and   attention   to   the
exploration of some opportunities at  the  expense  of  others,  following  a  gradual  sense-making
process that rests on entrepreneurs’ previous knowledge and involvement in the  projects.  Finally,
as  the  emerging  conceptual  framework  addresses  the  issue  of   resource   allocation   between
alternative  projects,  it  can  be  extended  to  a  more  general  case  of  management  of   multiple
development projects (Burgelman, 1991) and internal corporate  venturing  (Bower,  1970;  Garud
and Van de Ven, 1992; Block and MacMillan, 1993). In this  respect,  our  findings  reinforce  and
extend Van de Ven and Polley’s (1992) findings indicating the impact of resource availability  and
perceived likelihood of success in the decision to continue or terminate a corporate venture.  
The paper is composed  of  six  sections.  In  the  first  section,  we  discuss  the  distinctive
features of learning in  an  entrepreneurial  context.  Next,  we  present  the  research  site  and  we
discuss  our  methodology.  In  the  third  section,  we  provide  a  general  description  of  the  two
projects. In the following  sections,  we  discuss  insights  emerging  from  the  comparison  of  the
projects. Building on past literature and evidence from our study,  by  weaving  together  variables
resulting  from  the  comparison,  we  develop  a  model  of  learning  in  entrepreneurial  ventures.
Implications for research and practice are discussed in the final section.
3. The learning context in entrepreneurial ventures
A recent review  of  past  studies  on  learning  among  entrepreneurs  concludes  that,  despite  the
importance of the  issue,  research  is  still  at  a  preliminary  stage  (Agnedal,  1999).  In  a  recent
theoretical  contribution,  commenting   on   Kirzner’s   (1973)   insightful   observation   that   the
purposeful  search  for  information  that  follows  the  discovery  of  an  opportunity  is  central  to
entrepreneurial activity, Bygrave  and  Minniti  conclude  that  “entrepreneurship  is  a  process  of
learning, and a theory of entrepreneurship requires  a  theory  of  learning  (Minniti  and  Bygrave,
2001, p. 7).” Nevertheless, with some  exceptions  (i.e.  Bailey,  1986;  Guth,  Kumaraswamy  and
McErlean, 1991) researchers in the field of entrepreneurship have devoted little attention to  study
how entrepreneurs learn. 
Traditionally, research on the psychology of entrepreneurs focused on the  cognitive  traits,
such as risk propensity, need for achievement, and self-confidence, that differentiate entrepreneurs
from  non-entrepreneurs  (e.g.  Begley  and  Boyd,  1987;  Brockhaus,  1980;  McClelland,   1961;
Shaver and Scott, 1991; Forlani and Mullins, 2000). Empirical studies aimed at demonstrating  the
peculiarity  of  entrepreneurs’  psychological  traits,  however,  seem  to  have  failed   to   produce
conclusive results (Brockhaus and Horowitz, 1986; Low and McMillan,  1988).  More  recently,  a
number of studies shifted attention to the cognitive processes and mechanisms according to which
entrepreneurs select and process information, to make sense of the  external  environment  (Baron,
1998; Nicholls-Nixon, Cooper and  Woo,  2000;  Shane  and  Venkataraman,  2000).  Drawing  on
cognitive schema theory, Palich  and  Bagby  (1995)  observed  that  entrepreneurs  tend  to  frame
opportunities in a  more  favorable  way  than  non-entrepreneurs  do.  When  facing  an  uncertain
business situation, in  fact,  entrepreneurs  seem  to  emphasize  strengths  and  potential  for  gain,
whereas non-entrepreneurs tend to stress weaknesses and potential for loss.  Busenitz  and  Barney
(1997)  compared  the   way   entrepreneurs   and   managers   make   decisions,   and   found   that
entrepreneurs’ tend to use heuristics – simple decision rules that reduce the complexity of decision
processes – more extensively than managers do. The two  authors  speculate  that  these  cognitive
biases may be beneficial insofar  as  they  let  entrepreneurs  catch  windows  of  opportunity  even
when time constraints do not allow a thorough and rational analysis. Finally, Shane’s (2000) study
of different market applications of  the  same  invention  supports  the  argument  that  opportunity
recognition is driven more by the distinctive knowledge possessed by individuals,  rather  than  by
their personality traits. This idiosyncratic information allows people to discover opportunities  that
others cannot see, even if they are not actively searching for them (Hayek, 1945; Kirzner, 1997).
A  distinctive  feature  of  many  studies  on  entrepreneurial  cognition  –  be  it  related  to
opportunity recognition, risk  taking  or  other  –  seems  to  be  the  assumption  that  what  makes
entrepreneurs different is either a set of psychological traits, or  the  way  they  collect,  select  and
process information. Recent theoretical modeling of entrepreneurial learning seems  to  follow  the
same  approach.  Agndal’s  research  agenda  for  studying   learning   among   entrepreneurs,   for
instance,  concentrates  on  individual  learning  styles  (Bailey,  1986),  implicitly   assuming   the
existence of a fundamental difference between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs.  Minniti  and
Bygrave’s  dynamic  model  of  entrepreneurial  learning  proposes  a  representation  of  the   way
entrepreneurs modify their courses of action over time, on the basis  of  their  experience  (Minniti
and  Bygrave,  2001).  In  other  words,  studying  entrepreneurial   learning   has   generally   been
conceived as investigating the unique and distinctive way  in  which  entrepreneurs  acquire,  store
and use knowledge (Agndal, 1999; Minniti and Bygrave, 2001).  
Our research was based on a different assumption. Following a rising approach in research
on  entrepreneurial  cognition  (e.g.  Baron,  1998),  we  expanded  the   scope   of   analysis   from
individual traits to the context within which entrepreneurial learning takes place. A review of  past
research on entrepreneurship led us to the identification of three distinctive features of learning  in
entrepreneurial ventures, namely the exploratory nature of  the  process,  the  reliance  on  external
contributions, and the relatively high scarcity of resources available. 
Ambiguity and exploration
Dealing  with  an  ambiguous  environment  is  intrinsic  to  entrepreneurial  action.  According  to
Kirzner (1997), entrepreneurship requires the discovery  of  new  means-ends  relationships  rather
than the optimization of existing ones.  As  they  search  for  solutions  to  problems  that  are  still
imperfectly defined, as they explore applications of new technologies that are not fully developed,
and as they take guesses about which opportunities are worth pursuing, entrepreneurs experience a
high degree of uncertainty and ambiguity (Van de Ven and Polley, 1992; Garud and Van  de  Ven,
1992; Nicholls-Nixon, Cooper and Woo, 2000). According to  Weick  (1995),  in  fact,  ambiguity
arises in the presence of a poor  understanding  of  the  cause-effect  relationships  that  underlie  a
phenomenon, when information is problematical and it therefore becomes  difficult  to  assess  the
consequences of our decisions. In such cases, decisions call for an act  of  sense-making  -  i.e.  the
attribution of meaning to a complex reality,  an  act  of  interpretation  that  gradually  imposes  an
order on reality and helps “make sense” of the external environment (Weick, 1995). 
Learning  in  an  entrepreneurial  venture,  then,  seems  to  resemble   more   what   in   the
management field has been termed higher-level, generative learning,  as  opposed  to  lower  level,
adaptive learning (Fiol and Lyles, 1985;  Miner  and  Mezias,  1996),  whereby  adaptive  learning
involves the development of behavioral routines that allow an organization to perform a  repetitive
task in an increasingly  efficient  and  effective  way  (e.g.  Cyert  and  March,  1963;  Nelson  and
Winter, 1982). Indeed, a balanced combination of generative and adaptive learning  is  required  to
support long-term growth, as the exploitation of commercially successful new  ideas  provides  the
resources to support new exploration (Mintzberg and Waters, 1982). However, the  exploration  of
new combinations of  resources  is  a  qualifying  feature  of  entrepreneurial  action  (Schumpeter,
1936; Kirzner, 1977). Learning in an entrepreneurial venture has a creative  component  that  goes
beyond  repetition  and  incremental  optimization;  it  occurs  in  ambiguous  contexts,  and   often
involves the development of completely new solutions  or  radically  innovative  products.  As  the
task to solve does not involve repetition, the  outcome  of  generative  learning  is  not  so  much  a
change in routine behavior, as a change in the knowledge structures that sustain interpretation  and
action (Friedlander, 1983; Lyles and Schwenk, 1992). 
Successful entrepreneurial innovation, therefore, requires  an  increasing  understanding  of
contexts of use and functional implications of alternative solutions. At the  start  of  an  innovation
process, ambiguity is usually high: product concepts are new and ill defined, experience of  use  is
limited and the context of use is complex  (Clark,  1985).  Learning  takes  place  as  entrepreneurs
gradually manage to make sense of the connections between  the  different  technical  subsystems,
product functions, customers’ preferences, market structure, etc., (Weick, 1995). 
External contributions
A second distinctive feature of learning in an entrepreneurial venture seems to  be  its  reliance  on
external  contributions.  Research  shows  how  individual  social  capital   positively   affects   the
capacity of nascent  entrepreneurs  to  successfully  complete  their  projects  (e.g.  Davidsson  and
Honig, 2003). Although entrepreneurs play a pivotal role in the development process, in fact,  they
rarely  possess  all  the   competencies   required   for   the   success   of   the   venture.   Typically,
entrepreneurs possess a good knowledge of the  market  and  the  customers,  and  often  a  certain
degree of technical competence in his field. Often the actual realization  of  these  ideas,  however,
requires not only financial resources, but also skills and competencies that must be obtained  from
industrial, commercial and research partners, consultants, designers, etc (Birley, 1985; Dubini and
Aldrich, 1991; Larson, 1991). In  entrepreneurial  ventures,  then,  learning  often  arises  from  the
interaction of a number of actors that  are  in  part  external  to  the  organization.  The  support  of
scientists, engineers and other actors  that  possess  knowledge  and  skills  complementary  to  the
entrepreneurs’ is often required in order to move  from  the  initial  idea  to  the  actual  product  or
process. 
As the complexity of the technological bases and the dispersion of the sources of  expertise
increase,  in  fact,  innovation  requires  entrepreneurs  to  develop   and   manage   a   network   of
collaborations with partners of a different  nature  (Powell,  Koput  and  Smith-Doerr,  1996).  The
range  of  actors  involved  in  the  learning  process  extends  from  the  entrepreneur  –   locus   of
coordination  and  impulse  for  the  projects  –  to  his  close  collaborators  inside   the   company
(technicians, engineers, marketing people etc.) and  a  web  of  external  partners,  consultants  and
suppliers, who provide specific knowledge and competencies to the project. Industrial or  research
partners, suppliers, clients, consultants,  venture  capitalists  offer  a  contribution  that  often  goes
beyond the physical content of the exchange: they contribute to the  development  and  refinement
of the technologies embodied in new products and services and of the  organization  that  produces
and delivers them.
Limited resources
Finally entrepreneurs tend to face an intrinsic scarcity of  resources.  Several  studies  suggest  that
entrepreneurs operate under conditions of serious resource constraint and are constantly struggling
to obtain from the environment the complementary assets  and  resources  (capital,  first,  but  also
technology, skills, support, etc.)  required  to  develop  and  commercialize  their  ideas  (Kirchoff,
1994; Garnsey, 1998). Resource constraint in an  entrepreneurial  setting,  however,  is  not  just  a
matter of money. Entrepreneurial activity requires frequent decisions about what opportunities are
worth pursuing, and, among the various solutions available, which are  worth  exploring.  In  other
words, entrepreneurs are often called upon to decide  what  issues  are  worth  their  attention,  and
how much of their personal time should be  allocated  to  current  product  improvement  and  new
product development (Gifford, 1988). Considering that entrepreneurs tend to be the prime  movers
of all the projects they start, as they constantly provide direction, coordination, and enthusiasm  to
the other persons involved, their time and attention are often as critical and as scarce as money. 
This limited pool  of  available  resources  periodically  imposes  choices  regarding  which
paths to follow, which ideas to develop, which expectations to attend to, and, most of all,  whether
it  is  worth  persisting  with  certain  projects  or  not.  These  decisions  are  complicated   by   the
uncertainty that surrounds the commercial return of most initiatives. As  Van  de  Ven  and  Polley
write, “a central problem in managing and investing  in  innovations  is  determining  whether  and
how to  continue  a  developmental  effort  in  the  absence  of  concrete  performance  information
(1992, p. 92).”
In  summary,  distinctive  characteristics  of  entrepreneurial  ventures  may  influence   the
learning process in the following ways. First, entrepreneurial innovation is  concerned  more  with
exploration of  new  combination  of  resources  rather  than  with  optimization  of  existing  ones.
Learning,  therefore,  requires  the  gradual  reduction  of  ambiguity  surrounding  the  connection
between  resources,  technologies  and  customers’  needs.  Second,   learning   in   entrepreneurial
innovation is only partly under the entrepreneurs’ control. Some of the activities that contribute  to
the  overall  learning  process  are  actually  performed   by   consultants,   technicians,   scientists,
specialized suppliers, etc.,  whose  contributions  have  to  be  coordinated  and  integrated  by  the
entrepreneurs. Finally, the scarcity of resources  that  affects  most  entrepreneurial  ventures  may
affect learning in entrepreneurial innovation, as limited  capital,  time  and  attention  may  impose
periodic decisions about what paths are worth exploring, for how long  and  with  what  degree  of
commitment. Shortage of time, money and attention may also  aggravate  the  difficulty  of  facing
ambiguous situations (McCaskey, 1982).  We  believe  that  increasing  our  understanding  of  the
learning processes that underlie entrepreneurial innovation requires us to address the  implications
of  these  specific  conditions  affecting  entrepreneurial  ventures.  In   other   words,   explanatory
frameworks  should  not   only   address   how   entrepreneurs   gradually   reduce   the   ambiguity
surrounding  their  projects,  but  also  consider  how  external  contributions  and  the  scarcity   of
resources may affect the process.
4. Research Method
Introducing a recent special issue of the Journal of Business Venturing, Gartner and Birley  (2002)
observe  how  qualitative  research  is  rarely  used  in  the  entrepreneurship  field.  The  use  of   a
qualitative approach, however, is appropriate to the study of phenomena, such as  learning,  which
require a methodology that can trace processes as they unfold over  time,  and  is  sensitive  to  the
broader context and the perspective of the involved actors (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Miner and
Mezias, 1996; Lee, 1999). Past research, for instance, have fruitfully adopted  qualitative  methods
for data collection and analysis to investigate the learning processes  that  take  place  as  alliances
evolve over time (Ariño and  Garcia  De  La  Torre,  1998)  or  as  organizations  adopt  unfamiliar
technologies (Woyceshin, 2000). Following this approach, in this paper we adopt a method  based
on comparative case study (Eisenhardt, 1989, Langley, 1999), in order to  explore  process-related
conditions that influence successful learning in entrepreneurial innovation.
Research setting
In order to minimize the impact of environmental  and  context-specific  conditions,  we  analyzed
two development processes that  were  conducted  within  the  same  organization,  roughly  at  the
same time, and under the direction of the same person. The research setting is Futureplast, a  small
company whose core activities lie in the research and  development  of  new  technologies  for  the
lighting industry. Futureplast s.r.l. was founded in 1989 by two partners, Mr. Guzzoletti  and  Mrs.
Nobili, to produce low-cost, decorative iron  down-lights  for  low-tension  white-heat  lamps  and
halogen lamps. Mrs. Nobili, took charge of marketing and  sales  activities,  while  Mr.  Guzzoletti
oversaw product development and operations.  Four  years  later,  the  rising  pressure  of  Chinese
competitors induced the two partners to turn  to  product  differentiation.  In  the  following  years,
new professional and outdoor lines were added, and iron lamps were replaced by aluminum  items
less affected by Oriental competitors. Furthermore, decorative lines were substantially  restyled  in
order to re-position products in more profitable segments. At  the  time  of  our  study,  Futureplast
focused  on  the  highest  value-added  phases   of   the   value   chain   (design,   engineering   and
installation),  investing  more  than  5%  of  its  annual  sales  in  research  and  development,   and
completely outsourcing the actual production and assembly of components – based on mature  and
widely available technologies – to more than eighty small local companies, employing around 130
people.  Its  catalogue  comprised  around  300  products,  about  a  hundred  of  which   had   been
introduced in the three previous years. The company’s products were sold in over 50 countries, its
revenues topped 12 billion liras (around 6 million euros) and it  employed  nine  persons,  most  of
which directly involved in research and development.
According  to  criteria  widely  used  in  the  literature,   Futureplast   can   be   defined   an
entrepreneurial  firm.  Mr.  Guzzoletti  and  his  staff   are   constantly   engaged   in   development
processes that lead to the design of new products or production processes, and sustain firm growth
(Schumpeter, 1934; Carland, Hoy, Boulton and Carland, 1984). Prior to our study,  between  1994
and  1996,  the  company  introduced  around   a   hundred   technological   and   stylistic   product
innovations  and  four  substantial  innovations  in  production  technologies.   In   the   years   that
followed, the company kept expanding its product  range  by  adding  new  lines,  like  underwater
items   and   in-ground   installations,   and   acquiring   or   developing    new    technologies    for
manufacturing aluminum and stainless steel products. Its revenues  have  increased  steadily  since
the foundation, and in recent years the company has moved three times in  order  to  accommodate
new labs and warehouses. Furthermore,  Mr.  Guzzoletti  conforms  to  the  seminal  definition  by
Stevenson and Gumpert (1985), according to whom entrepreneurship can be conceived  as  pursue
of opportunities for innovation – three of which will be described in this paper – regardless  of  the
resources currently controlled. In fact, Futureplast’s expansion and  growth  relied  extensively  on
external contributions, also thanks to the geographical location of the company  –  near  Milan,  in
the middle of  the  industrial  district  of  Brianza  Milanese.  Manufacturing  and  assembling  was
outsourced to specialized producers of lighting components, located in the  surrounding  industrial
district. Product design and styling was commissioned to professional industrial designers,  widely
available  in  the  Milan  area.  Development  of  new  products  and  technologies  often  involved
external partners like engineering consultants or research labs, located in the district.
Our study focused on two major development projects  aimed  at  exploring  new  business
opportunities. One project aimed at reproducing a plastic cable, which had the potential to become
the dominant technology in the lighting industry. After several months of unfruitful efforts  it  was
abandoned.  The  second  project,  conversely,  led  to  the   successful   development   of   a   laser
technology for high-quality manufacturing  of  glass  furniture  complements.  The  fact  that  both
projects aimed at reproducing already existing technologies allowed us to rule  out  the  possibility
that  in  one  case  the  goal  of  the  project  was   simply   impossible   to   achieve.   While   these
technologies were already available, they were not known to the  company  and  their  commercial
applications were initially not clear. In  both  cases,  therefore,  the  development  efforts  involved
exploration, experimentation and risk-taking  on  the  company’s  side.  Figure  1  summarizes  the
chronology of the processes and the study.
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Data collection
Data collection was mainly based on semi-structured interviews with the relevant  actors  involved
in the process: the two partners, Mr. Guzzoletti and Mrs.  Nobili,  an  employee  from  Futureplast
who took part in both projects, and two representatives of major external partners for each project,
CNR and CISE-ENEL. In the first round, we interviewed all the internal actors, in order to  collect
background  information  on  the  company  (history,  strategy,  structure,   etc.)   and   preliminary
information on the two projects. Interviews took place in early 1997, as both  projects  were  in  an
early stage. A second round of interviews was conducted some time  after  the  termination  of  the
first project, while the second project was in an advanced stage (see figure 1). In the second round
we interviewed Mr. Guzzoletti and his staff again, and we interviewed two external actors  for  the
first time. Other informal interviews with  Mr.  Guzzoletti  followed,  which  helped  us  to  clarify
minor points and check the validity  of  our  tentative  interpretations.  As  some  informants  were
interviewed more than once, in total we conducted nine interviews with five  different  informants.
Interviews were aimed at identifying the main phases of the process, from  the  initial  stimulus  to
the result, and followed a common structure. Our informants were  first  asked  to  reconstruct  the
story of the project as they lived it – or  they  were  living  it,  trying  to  distinguish  facts  (how  it
started, who was involved, etc.) from personal observations. We then  asked  them  to  describe  in
more detail their contribution to the projects, the nature of  their  involvement  (contractual  terms,
expected benefits, etc.) and the interaction with other actors. During the interviews, we  stimulated
our informants to specifically refer to facts and events that left a trace in their  memory;  however,
we never referred explicitly to concepts like “knowledge” or “learning”, so that  our  own  guiding
framework did not condition their description. Each interview lasted between one  and  two  hours
and, in most cases, they were tape recorded and transcribed. Both researchers were present at most
interviews. Field notes and transcriptions were examined after each interview in  order  to  discuss
emerging themes and prepare the following interviews. Some interviews were followed  up  either
personally or by telephone, in  order  to  collect  additional  information  and  refine  the  emerging
framework. Multiple, open-end interviews  helped  us  to  collect  both  factual  data  and  personal
impressions and to reconstruct a detailed chronology of the process. Although  our  reconstruction
was based on our informants’ recall, combining multiple perspectives helped us  to  move  beyond
individual perceptual biases and alleviated potential recall problems.
Data analysis
Gartner and Birley (2002) have recently lamented that qualitative research in the  entrepreneurship
field often  fails  to  go  beyond  simple  description  to  propose  an  explanation  of  the  observed
phenomena. Developing an explanatory framework, however, was central to our research. In order
to move beyond simple description we combined what Mohr (1982) calls “variable”  analysis  and
“process” analysis. We first searched our data for similarities and differences that let us identify  a
number of key concepts. We then looked for longitudinal connections between these concepts that
suggested relations of causality – what Miles and Huberman (1984)  call  “stories”.  According  to
Miles and Huberman (1984) moving back and forth between concepts  and  stories  is  essential  to
the development of a good explanatory framework.  
Data analysis used common methods for  grounded  theory  building  (Glaser  and  Strauss,
1967; Miles and Huberman, 1984) and followed the logic of comparative case study, according  to
which empirically grounded theoretical propositions are derived from the search of discriminating
variables that appear to influence the outcome of an observed process  (Eisenhardt,  1989).  In  our
case the discriminating variable was success or failure in  developing  the  target  technology.  The
analysis  of  data  combined  within-case   analysis   with   cross-case   comparison,   and   can   be
summarized as a three-step process. 
The first part of  the  analysis  was  based  on  an  accurate  coding  of  the  interviews.  We
searched interviews for passages that contained references to the development process. The search
was  conducted  independently  by  the  researchers;  later  comparison   of   independent   analysis
showed a substantial agreement. Minor differences were solved through mutual consensus. At this
stage, our goal was to identify key variables that could  be  associated  with  the  way  the  projects
advanced, were re-directed or eventually terminated. The literature on organizational learning  and
innovation management offered us  a  terminology  and  conceptual  references  that  helped  us  to
develop labels for the identified emerging variables. For instance, the passage “Monteverdi’s  help
was fundamental in the selection of the most appropriate research center  for  a  chemical  analysis
(…)” was first coded as “boundary-spanning role”.
The second step was aimed at the  identification  of  variables  that  could  account  for  the
different outcome of  the  two  projects.  Discriminating  variables  emerged  from  the  systematic
search  of  analogies  and  differences  in  the  two  processes,  separately  conducted  by  the   two
researchers. This procedure helped us reduce the potential influence of post-rationalization  as  we
tried to move beyond our informants’ explicit attributions  of  causality,  in  order  to  identify  the
underlying variables that discriminated between the two processes. In some cases, the  comparison
led to a  homogenization  of  concepts  into  broader  categories:  “preliminary  search”  and  “past
experience”, for instance, were  grouped  into  “prior  related  knowledge”.  Other  variables  were
dropped because they assumed the same state (high or low, absent or present, etc.) in both projects
(in both cases, for instance, Mr. Guzzoletti relied on the initial  help  of  Mr.  Monteverdi)  and  no
causal relationship with the different outcomes could be plausibly inferred. In the end, we isolated
four variables, which assumed a different state in the two  processes  and  whose  combined  effect
seemed to explain the observed differences:  the  degree  of  perceived  causal  indeterminacy,  the
amount  of  prior  related  knowledge,  the  degree  of  control  over  the  process,  the   uncertainty
associated with the commercial return. Findings from this stage are reported  in  the  next  section,
after a brief description of the cases.
In the final part, a longitudinal analysis of the cases allowed us to capture the  evolution  of
the interaction between the critical variables emerging from the cross-case analysis.  We  searched
for  causal  associations  between  the  four  variables,  following  Miles  and  Huberman’s  (1984)
methodological  recommendations  to  develop  a  causal  network  –  i.e.  a  display  of  the   most
important variables and of the relationships among  them.  We  relied  on  chronological  tables  to
order variables and critical events in a longitudinal order. A number of  iterations  between  theory
and data  eventually  led  us  to  weave  these  variables  into  a  meaningful  pattern:  an  emerging
conceptual  framework  centered  on  the  entrepreneur,   relating   success   and   failure   to   self-
reinforcing  interaction  among  these  variables  producing  positive  or  negative  effects   on   the
learning process. Feedback from Mr. Guzzoletti helped us  refine  our  tentative  explanation.  The
resulting model is displayed in figure 2. 
5. A tale of two projects
The analyzed projects were carried out, almost simultaneously, over a time period that  goes  from
spring 1996 to winter 1998. As anticipated,  both  involved  the  reproduction  of  already  existing
technologies, samples of which came into Mr. Guzzoletti’s possession  during  visits  to  industrial
fairs. In the spring of 1996, at an industrial fair in Munich, a plastic cable  that  could  be  used  for
the conduction of light caught Guzzoletti’s attention. Because of its physical  properties  the  cable
could have revolutionized the dominant technology for  light  conduction,  if  a  system  to  reduce
production costs had been devised.  Back  home,  Guzzoletti  started  a  project  to  investigate  the
possibility of reproducing the cable technology. The first step was hiring Mr. Monteverdi, a young
physicist from the University of Milan, Politecnico. In Guzzoletti’s words: 
The employment of a person with a solid scientific background was  meant  to  provide  structure  and
method to the research activity carried out at Futureplast, and to open  up  new  channels  towards  the
external acquisition of new, front-line scientific knowledge.
Monteverdi  was  assigned  the  task  of  assisting  in  the  collection  and  interpretation  of   scientific
information regarding light-conduction  technology.  Over  a  two-month  span,  he  undertook  an  accurate
study of the existing literature on the most developed methods  for  the  conduction  of  light.  At  the  same
time, Mr. Guzzoletti contacted the company that had produced the cable. They agreed to send  a  couple  of
samples of the material; however, they were not willing to transfer any kind of information, not even on the
basis of a formal cooperation. Most of the information collected by Mr. Guzzoletti and his staff came  from
a review  of  the  scientific  literature  on  optical  fibers  and  from  a  search  of  the  American  patents  on
inventions. These sources, however, were not so rich as expected, so Mr. Guzzoletti was forced to look  for
an expert partner who possessed the required knowledge and instruments to carry out an exploratory  study
on the new material on behalf of the firm.
He decided to turn to the academic world. At first,  universities  were  reluctant  to  cooperate
with an entrepreneur who did not possess an academic degree. In this respect, the presence of  Mr.
Monteverdi helped select and contact academic institutes, and establish the  relationship  with  the
one that  was  finally  chosen:  a  research  facility  belonging  to  the  Consiglio  Nazionale  per  la
Ricerca (CNR), a public academic  institution  that  possessed  qualified  personnel  and  advanced
scientific equipment. The contract implied a fixed  reward  for  the  analysis  of  the  chemical  and
physical characteristics of the cable, and for the search of its basic  components.  Research  started
soon afterwards and took place in the laboratories of CNR. The study was  carried  out  essentially
by CNR personnel. Mr. Guzzoletti and Mr. Monteverdi were present at the first few  tests,  but,  as
both admitted later, they did not possess the required knowledge  to  understand  what  was  going
on, and soon they just waited for the periodic communication of  results.  Meanwhile,  Futureplast
staff was waiting for positive signals to start studying a process that allowed the production of  the
new material at a reasonable cost; designing a production process, in fact, required the  product  to
be defined beforehand. Within six months, 20 out of the 21 chemical components required  by  the
new material were identified and part of its revolutionary properties was discovered.  Without  the
missing component, however, Futureplast was unable to adequately  master  all  the  technological
aspects necessary for the production of  the  new  cable.  At  the  end  of  the  semester,  then,  Mr.
Guzzoletti decided to abandon the project and to write off the investment as unsuccessful.
At about the same  time,  Futureplast  staff  was  involved  in  another  major  development
project, which was not strictly related  to  the  lighting  business.  In  September  1996,  during  an
international  exhibition  in  Moscow,  some  crystal  objects  caught  Mr.   Guzzoletti’s   attention
because of the extreme quality of the  engraving  of  their  internal  surfaces.  Seeing  a  potentially
rewarding opportunity for diversification, Mr. Guzzoletti decided to investigate  the  technological
process that had produced those objects. Although no information was available at the  exhibition,
his guess was that they could only  be  produced  with  laser  technology.  Guzzoletti  was  already
familiar  with  laser  technology.  Not  long  before,  they  had  explored  laser  technology  in   the
preliminary phase of a project aimed at developing an  application  for  entertainment  –  so  called
“laser  shows”  –  soon  abandoned  when  it  had  become  clear  that  it  required  a  much   larger
investment that Futureplast could afford. The search had nevertheless led to amass a  considerable
body of literature in a specialized library and to acquire elementary notions of physics required  to
understand laser technology. 
Soon after having returned from Moscow, a  casual  chat  with  Mr.  Nava,  an  engineer  at
CISE-ENEL, confirmed Mr. Guzzoletti’s guess about the origin of the crystal object. CISE-ENEL
is an advanced  research  laboratory  owned  by  a  large  electricity  supplier,  which  at  that  time
possessed the highest level of expertise in laser technologies in Italy. Mr. Nava was one of CISE’s
experts in laser technology. He had already met Mr. Guzzoletti when the  latter  was  investigating
the laser-show technology. Months later,  Mr.  Nava  was  visiting  Futureplast  again  looking  for
external orders on research activities. Mr. Guzzoletti showed him the glass  objects  and  advanced
the idea that they were the product of a sophisticated laser system. It turned out that Mr. Nava  had
been at the same exhibition and had noticed the same objects. In the past, he had collaborated with
some Russian universities and he had already made some preliminary study. 
CISE was not a direct competitor and there was no risk that they  could  make  commercial
use of the knowledge developed in the project, so Mr.  Guzzoletti  decided  to  collaborate  for  the
development of an advanced system for manufacturing glass products with laser  technology.  The
agreement (annual collaboration contract, commissioned by Futureplast) was expressed in general
terms:  CISE  would  be  rewarded  by  man-hours  for  their  collaboration  on  the  research.  The
fundamental goal was to  define  the  best  possible  use  of  laser  technology  with  regard  to  the
characteristics of the manufacturing technology. 
Much research and development activity took place in a laboratory  set  up  by  Futureplast
for the purpose. The only phase that was carried  out  at  CISE’s  labs  was  the  simulation  of  the
production process. The initial phase of the project was dedicated to the identification of the  most
appropriate laser source and to the  design  of  the  architecture  of  the  system.  The  fundamental
problems to be solved were related to the high costs and to the dangers  involved  in  the  use  of  a
laser source. The search for a solution  involved  several  computer  simulations  that  allowed  the
researchers to reproduce the  behavior  of  the  system  and  to  analyze  its  critical  elements.  The
development and engineering of the  system  took  place  at  Futureplast,  and  involved  extensive
experimentation and reverse engineering in order to gain an intimate knowledge of the technology
of laser sources and of their electronic  support.  In  order  to  achieve  the  full  automation  of  the
system  and  a  smooth  and   effective   integration   of   all   the   technological   subsystems,   the
development and production of the first prototype was carried  out  by  a  team  composed  by  Mr.
Nava and Mr. Guzzoletti, two technicians from CISE and one from the  laser  supplier,  plus  other
external consultants, involved in the solution  of  specific  problems  of  technological  subsystems
(mechanics, electronics, etc.). In the second half of 1998, a functioning prototype was successfully
produced, amid the enthusiasm of all the team members. 
6. Conditions of success and failure in the observed projects
Comparing the two cases, four variables emerged as  discriminating  between  the  successful  and
the unsuccessful story (see table 1): the degree of perceived causal indeterminacy,  the  possession
of related knowledge base, the  degree  of  control  of  the  process,  the  perceived  uncertainty  of
returns. 
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Perceived causal indeterminacy
A first difference between the two projects was related to  the  characteristics  of  the  fundamental
problem to be solved. In the first case, the attention of Mr. Nava, the  main  research  partner,  had
already been attracted by laser systems  even  before  getting  in  touch  with  Futureplast.  As  Mr.
Nava admitted:
(…) the basic ideas for the project had already taken shape, because I had been  working  in  the  laser
field for years and our  ideas  had  already  been  clarified  by  our  preliminary  contact  with  Russian
technicians. In other words, we had problems to solve, but we had already taken some steps in  earlier
experiences, even though we had some substantial changes to make in order  to  improve  productivity
and precision.
Mr. Nava and Mr. Guzzoletti  used  words  like  “rather  structured”  and  “well  outlined”  to  describe  the
problems posed by the design of a new laser system. A preliminary review of the available  optical  sources
had clearly indicated the critical  issues  to  be  solved:  ensuring  safety  for  the  operators  and  raising
precision and speed above what Mr. Guzzoletti and Mr. Nava thought was  the  industry  standard.
Although  at  that  stage  Mr.  Guzzoletti  and  Mr.  Nava  did  not  know  yet  how  to  solve  these
problems, they had at least a clear perception of the main issues to be dealt with, and the  types  of
expertise to involve:
[after the preliminary stage]  we  sat  down  and  reviewed  all  the  different  components  we
needed and where we could source them. In some cases, we  already  knew  whom  we  could
turn to. In others, like the optical source, we started searching for suitable suppliers (…)
A computer simulation helped define specifications compatible with the desired productivity levels,  which
guided the subsequent stages of the process, as Mr. Guzzoletti, Mr. Nava and their staff  explored  different
solutions.
Compared  to  the  laser  system,  the  reproduction  of  the  plastic   cable   involved   basic
research, whose steps were perceived by Mr. Guzzoletti as far less “clear” than those  required  by
the integration, albeit in an innovative and  unconventional  way,  of  existing  technologies  (laser
technology, crystal manufacturing, electronics,  and  information  technology).  The  initial  search
through existing patents did not make the task ahead any clearer. As Mr. Guzzoletti observed,  the
review of the existing literature let them “exclude some research  paths,  but  did  not  really  show
[them] a way to go.” He knew that  the  first  task  ahead  was  the  identification  of  the  chemical
structure  of  the  cable.  Yet,  although  he  had  a  clear  perception  of  his  ultimate  goals  –   i.e.
identifying the basic components of the polymer and finding a  relatively  inexpensive  production
process – the nature of the experiments involved in the early stages and  ran  by  CNR  technicians
were rather obscure to him:
In the beginning I asked them to explain me what they were going to do, and  of  course  they
did it (…) I understood that discovering the components required running several trials,  but  I
could not grasp more than that.
In the case of the laser system, instead, the causal connections between the end  –  the  development  of  the
system – and the means to get there – e.g. the hierarchy of different design issues (productivity,  precision,
speed, safety, etc.) – were perceived more clearly. An initial difference between the  two  projects,
then, seems to  be  related  to  the  diverse  understanding  of  the  causal  relationships  connecting
means to ends, or, in other words, to different degrees of  causal  indeterminacy  in  the  tasks  that
Mr. Guzzoletti was facing.
The concept of causal indeterminacy refers to the  degree  of  understanding  of  the  causal
relationships that underlie a  phenomenon  (Orton  and  Weick,  1988).  Orton  and  Weick  (1988)
observe that a  certain  degree  of  causal  indeterminacy  is  intrinsic  to  any  non-routine  task  or
problem – and therefore also to entrepreneurial projects. Usually, individuals reduce the degree  of
causal indeterminacy in a task as they start acting and trigger reactions from the environment  that,
once interpreted, increase the sophistication of  their  representation  of  the  environment  (Weick,
1979).  To  some  extent,  then,  causal  indeterminacy  can  be  reduced  through  exploration  and
experimentation that help individuals to improve their understanding of their task. Indeed,  one  of
the problems might have been perceived as more structured also because the solving  process  was
already at an advanced stage, and some preliminary  analysis  conducted  by  external  parties  had
helped clarify most issues.
Prior related knowledge
Causal indeterminacy, however, is not entirely intrinsic to  a  phenomenon  or  a  technology.  The
perception of a causal relationship as ambiguous depends also on the richness and accuracy of  the
mental frameworks that we use to interpret  the  observed  phenomenon  (Glassman,  1973;  Orton
and Weick, 1988). In this respect, as we increase our knowledge  and  understanding  of  a  certain
phenomenon - i.e. we increase the richness and the accuracy of our mental maps -  we  reduce  the
causal indeterminacy that we perceive (Weick, 1995). Indeed, the comparative analysis of the  two
cases pointed at the role of the amount and type of knowledge possessed by the entrepreneur in his
capacity to make sense of the problems he was facing.
In the case of the plastic cable, although the potential application of  the  cable  technology
had a closer link to the core business of  the  company,  the  development  of  the  new  technology
required fundamentals of optics and chemistry that were far from  anything  that  he  and  his  staff
mastered. Mr. Guzzoletti explicitly related his initial difficulties to his lack of  competence  in  the
core technologies involved (“You see, I have a technical degree and some practical  experience  in
engineering, but I am not a chemist”) and observed how  Mr.  Monteverdi,  who  was  a  physicist,
could not be has helpful as in the other case. Mr. Monteverdi added that  the  search  of  American
patents did not help them improve their knowledge of the phenomenon much.
In the second case, instead, Mr. Nava had been working in the field for  twenty  years,  and
at the start of the project Mr. Guzzoletti was already familiar with laser technology. A few months
earlier, exploring the possibility  to  start  a  production  of  “laser  shows”,  he  had  collected  and
reviewed the existing scientific literature on physics and laser  technology,  in  order  to  learn  the
scientific fundamentals of laser technology. With the help  of  Mr.  Monteverdi,  a  comprehensive
library had been set up in Futureplast laboratories, by thoroughly searching local research  centers,
and by integrating the search with the acquisition of texts at that time published only in the United
States.  A  systematic  review  of  American  invention  patents  had  helped  them  understand  the
fundamental characteristics and the recent evolution of laser technology. “More  than  50  kilos  of
catalogues on laser systems, sources and components” –  as  Mr.  Monteverdi  referred  to  them  –
were collected. As Mr. Guzzoletti remarked, the review of  American  patents  helped  them  grasp
the basic knowledge required to effectively reverse-engineer all the components they  were  using.
Indeed, Mr. Nava explicitly indicated Mr. Guzzoletti’s technical skills  and  understanding  as  one
of the main factors affecting the smoothness of the process.
Past studies (Cohen and Levinthal, 1991, Szulanski, 1996) have shown that the capacity of
an organization or a business  unit  to  acquire  knowledge  from  another  organization  or  unit  is
affected by the amount of related knowledge  possessed.  Cohen  and  Levinthal  (1991)  described
this capability as “absorptive capacity”. Prior related knowledge,  in  this  respect,  is  expected  to
increase  the  capacity  to  appreciate  the  value   of   external   knowledge   and   to   facilitate   its
understanding and adoption.  Evidence  from  the  comparative  analysis  of  the  cases  suggests  a
similar phenomenon, whereby the possession of the required knowledge base helps reduce,  in  the
initial stage,  the  perceived  indeterminacy  in  the  task  ahead.  In  this  respect,  the  role  of  Mr.
Monteverdi was fundamental, not only as a “broker”  of  books  and  scientific  contacts,  but  also
because he had introduced Mr. Guzzoletti to the basic terminology and concepts of physical  laws,
providing him with sufficient knowledge to understand the nature  and  implications  of  the  basic
technologies of the systems.
Control over the process
Another fundamental difference between the ways the two  projects  were  managed  seems  to  be
related to the degree of control that the focal actor and decision-maker, Mr.  Guzzoletti,  was  able
to  exercise  over  the  process.  We  define  control  in  cognitive  terms,  as  the  capacity   of   the
entrepreneur to monitor a process and to affect its direction. With  the  exception  of  a  number  of
computer simulations, which helped produce specifications for the system in an early  stage,  most
research  activities  that  led  to  the  successful  development  of  the  laser  system  took  place  at
Futureplast labs, where Mr. Guzzoletti was working in close contact with the external technicians.
In this way, he was able to observe and  discuss  their  tests  and  trials.  Reverse  engineering  was
systematically done on all  the  components  of  the  system  in  order  to  acquire  all  the  relevant
knowledge, especially on the electronic components and on the laser source, so that  the  company
could, later, reconstruct the whole system autonomously. As Mr. Guzzoletti recalled: 
Every day, at the end of the working day, when the external technicians had left, we locked  ourselves
up  in  the  lab  until  2.00  o’clock  in  the  morning  to  repeat  every  test  and  to  disassemble  every
component, until we were sure that we had understood their nature and their potential. In this way, we
gained an intimate  knowledge  of  every  component,  which  made  it  easier  for  us  to  develop  and
improve the integrating system.
At the end  of  the  project,  the  profound  knowledge  of  the  technological  subsystems  acquired  by  Mr.
Guzzoletti, Mr. Nava and their staff allowed them to reproduce internally  all  the  components  –  with  the
exception of the optic  source  –  and  to  adapt  them  to  the  specific  needs  of  the  system.  As  Mr.
Guzzoletti observed:
[the internally designed components] were not only cheaper,  but  even  better  that  those  we
found  on  the  market.  More  fit  to  the  system.  Initially  we   had   turned   to   commercial
components in order to  save  money.  In  fact,  our  second  prototype  used  almost  only  re-
designed components.
In the case of  the  plastic  cable,  on  the  other  hand,  technology  development  was  largely  outside  Mr.
Guzzoletti’s  control.  Experiments  took  place  at  CNR,  where   Mr.   Guzzoletti   was   “delegating   and
observing”,  as  he  himself  remarked.  Research  activities,  then,  were  carried   out   mainly   by   CNR’s
researchers, while Futureplast was involved only  as  an  external  observer.  Mr.  Guzzoletti  and  his  staff,
unable to participate in the analyses that were carried out by CNR, gradually detached from the process and
passed by the labs only to get the results of the tests. As Mr. Monteverdi recalled:
We didn’t feel competent enough and, as a matter of fact, we acknowledged the leadership  of  CNR’s
researchers over the project. “They are the ones who know” - we thought, so  we  essentially  gave  up
the direction of the phases of the process. Unfortunately, CNR’s researchers were not so  interested  in
the actual outcome of the project.
Although there is no evidence that a higher degree of control would have led  to  the  discovery  of
the missing  element,  what  ultimately  undermined  the  possibility  that  further  research  efforts
would eventually produce a result was the gradual loss of confidence in the potential return of  the
project, which, as we will discuss in the next  paragraph,  was  brought  about  by  the  absence  of
control over the process.
Perceived uncertainty of return
Cognitive risk theory posits that individuals select investments  according  to  their  assessment  of
the probabilities of risk  and  reward  associated  with  the  available  alternatives,  in  an  effort  to
maximize  their  utility  (Kahneman  and  Lovallo,  1993).  In  the  case   of   Futureplast,   another
fundamental difference between the two projects was the actual capacity of the  entrepreneur,  Mr.
Guzzoletti,  to  assess  the  extent  of  the  potential  return  coming  from  each   project,   and   the
associated risk.
Mr. Guzzoletti’s assessment was critical  because,  although  other  parties  were  involved  in
both projects, their successful completion depended chiefly on Futureplast’s commitment.  Let  us
consider the failed project first.  CNR  is  an  academic  organization  with  no  commercial  drive.
Furthermore, even from an academic point of view, CNR had no specific interest  in  fiber  optics,
and Mr. Guzzoletti and Mr.  Monteverdi  expressed  the  opinion  that  CNR  did  not  seem  much
interested in investing on the development  of  specific  competence  in  the  field.   For  CNR,  the
project was just another external research order that they fulfilled diligently, but with no particular
commitment. As a researcher we interview observed, “[CNR] often work[s] for  companies.  They
take us samples and ask us to analyze their chemical structure.” Furthermore, the contract  did  not
relate the compensation to the achievement of a specific result, but only to  the  carrying  out  of  a
series of tests. In other words, Futureplast  was  the  only  party  really  interested  in  the  eventual
completion of the project. The decision whether the project should be terminated or not, therefore,
rested only in the hands of Mr. Guzzoletti, who at  that  stage,  as  we  have  mentioned,  had  little
understanding of or control over the process, as he himself observed:
The successful development of the plastic cable was, unfortunately,  largely  outside  our  control  and
CNR did not seem to be so keen in investing in optic-fiber technology. On top of that, even though we
had successfully identified the 21 components, we would still have had to find a  way  to  produce  the
cable at a reasonable cost, before we could finally start to study its application in the lighting industry.
Futureplast is a small company and we can’t afford to wait that long for such  an  uncertain  return  on
our investment.
Behind Guzzoletti’s decision to terminate the plastic-cable project  and  to  dedicate  most  of  its  time  and
attention  to  the  development  of  the  laser  system,  there  seems  to  have  been  a  gradual   loss   of
confidence in the success of the process. Futureplast  had  been  expecting  results  from  CNR  for
months in order to start the feasibility study of the  production  process.  At  the  expiration  of  the
contract,  however,  time  and  money  invested   until   then   had   produced   results   inferior   to
expectations: a component was still missing and there were no certainties about the  time  required
to identify it. The commercial return on the investment was becoming more  and  more  distant  in
time and difficult to assess. On the other front,  the  potential  return  associated  to  the  successful
development of the laser system  was  becoming  clearer  and  clearer,  as  the  initial  steps  in  the
collaboration with CISE-ENEL were producing encouraging results in terms of the  structuring  of
the  problem.  Later,  the  systematic  respect  of  budgets,  timetables,  and  expected   milestones,
gradually reinforced Guzzoletti’s confidence  in  the  success  of  the  process  and  the  motivation
associated with the incentives associated to it, as implied in his narrative:
With time, I got more and more enthusiastic about the laser. I could tell that  we  were  slowly  getting
somewhere.  (…)  After  the  first  prototype  was  built,  I  knew  that  it  was  just  a  matter  of   little
improvements before we could finally start thinking about the market.
While the identification of the components of the plastic cable was only the first step in  a  process
where other substantial issues, such as efficient production of the  cable,  were  still  unsolved,  the
development of the laser system seemed to have an immediate market application. 
7. Self-reinforcing cognitive processes in entrepreneurial innovation
The longitudinal analysis of the cases suggests that the four variables mentioned in the last section
did  not  affect  the  learning  process  separately.  Their  combined   action   underpinned   a   self-
reinforcing virtuous (or vicious) circle that affected the effectiveness  of  the  learning  process  by
influencing the allocation of limited attention and resources to the projects.
Past studies of risk taking and decision-making have highlighted the  risks  of  vicious  circles
trapping managers and entrepreneurs in dangerous downward spirals, as disappointing results lead
to further risk taking, increasing the likelihood  of  further  disappointment.  Staw  and  colleagues
(Staw, 1976; Staw and Ross, 1978; Staw  and  Fox,  1977)  introduced  the  concept  of  escalating
commitment  to  describe  the   observed   tendency   to   increasingly   commit   resources   to   an
unsuccessful course of action, with the frequent consequence of furthering losses. Later,  Bateman
and Zeithaml (1989) observed how the perceived scarcity of organizational  slacks  might  lead  to
more  risky  behavior,   and   therefore   expose   decision   makers   to   potentially   more   severe
repercussions of negative results. More recently, Simon, Houghton and Savelli (2003)  found  that
small business owners who are unsatisfied with current performance tend to introduce  more  risky
products, by entering unfamiliar markets or investing a high amount of  resources.  Such  behavior
was eventually associated with lower subsequent product performance.
Our findings showed a somewhat different picture.  In  the  case  of  Futureplast,  shortage  of
resources seemed to restrain commitment to a seeming unsuccessful course of  action,  rather  than
stimulate it. In fact, a comparison of the two projects showed the  increasing  commitment  of  Mr.
Guzzoletti to the laser-system project – reflected in the renewal of  the  cooperation  contract  with
CISE-ENEL –  and  a  decreasing  involvement  in  the  plastic-cable  project,  culminating  in  the
decision not to proceed in the  search  for  the  missing  component.  This  explanation  reflects  an
interpretation shared by the two main actors involved in the projects. Both Mr. Guzzoletti and Mr.
Monteverdi, in fact, expressed their confidence that “given time and  resources”  they  could  have
made it  even  in  the  second  case.  Of  course  this  may  or  may  not  be  actually  true,  but  Mr.
Guzzoletti’s point of view on the  matter  did  not  relate  failure  to  an  intrinsic  difficulty  of  the
problem to be solved, but to the lack of resources that affected the company:
My time is limited and Futureplast  resources  are  what  they  are.  There  are  only  so  many
projects that we can run at a certain time and sometimes we have to make a choice.
While allocation of substantial resources is not  always  sufficient  to  guarantee  successful  results,  in  the
absence of resources and commitment the likelihood of success may decrease dramatically.
As we have observed in the last section,  the  decreasing  commitment  to  the  first  project
seems to have been led by the increasing uncertainty associated with the commercial return of  the
plastic-cable project, compared with the growing confidence on the successful  development  of  a
marketable laser system. This difference was partly related to the different degree of  control  over
the process exercised in the two cases. In the case of the plastic cable, as research was  carried  out
essentially in the CNR’s lab, there was no way for Guzzoletti, as we have mentioned, to assess the
likelihood of success and failure and the time frame required for the completion of the research. In
the other case, setting up an in-house laboratory  helped  Guzzoletti  keep  a  close  control  on  the
advancement of the project and make more precise estimates of costs, time and potential returns.
It is possible also that Guzzoletti’s  decisions  were  affected  by  the  “bold  forecast”  bias
described by Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), that is the tendency of members of a project  team  to
produce over-optimistic forecasts about the relative risk and the expected completion  time  of  the
project. It is possible, therefore, that the gradual loss of faith in the first  project  did  not  reflect  a
lack  of  information,  but  a  gradual  shift  from  an  over-optimistic  “insider  view”  to   a   more
pessimistic “outsider view” that followed the diminishing involvement in the process  (Kahneman
and Lovallo, 1993). Regardless of the underlying cognitive mechanism, evidence  from  our  study
suggests a relationship between control over the process and the perceived  uncertainty  of  results.
Whether this connection depends on a rational analysis of  the  situation  or  on  the  heuristic  bias
described by Kahneman and Lovallo, however, cannot be inferred from our data.
What seems to  have  affected  the  different  capacity  of  Futureplast  staff  to  control  the
processes is the amount of prior related knowledge. In the first case, in fact, the  scarce  degree  of
control over the process did not depend only from its physical localization,  but  also,  as  reported
by Mr. Guzzoletti and Mr. Monteverdi, from their  lack  of  background  knowledge  in  chemistry
and optics, which made it practically impossible to follow the trials. Indeed, as we have  seen,  the
entrepreneur’s lack of competence in chemistry was the main reason why they  had  to  turn  to  an
external partner to run all the trials involved in the early stage of the project.  In  the  second  case,
instead, Guzzoletti possessed the knowledge base required for the design  of  the  new  technology
and could follow the development project step-by-step, actively taking part in it  and  coordinating
the efforts of the other partners.
Taking an active part in the project seems to  have  ultimately  affected  the  entrepreneur’s
commitment and the way he distributed his resources among the project: not only finance, but also
time and attention. In fact, while in the first case Guzzoletti soon stopped participating, even as an
observer, to the tests that were run at CNR, in the second he was getting more and  more  involved
in the development of the system. The increasing allocation of time  and  attention  produced  as  a
side effect a  substantial  increase  in  the  related  knowledge  base:  involvement  in  the  research
activity led to a significant enrichment in Guzzoletti’s expertise in the design of laser  technology,
as demonstrated, in the final stage of the process, by the capacity  to  reproduce  and  improve  the
design of all components but one - i.e. the laser source, whose core technology  was,  incidentally,
based on optics. Also, increased involvement in the project, associated with  enriched  knowledge,
reduced the intrinsic  causal  indeterminacy  perceived  in  the  task  to  complete,  with  a  positive
effect, again, on the degree of control.
-----------------------------
Figure 2 about here
-----------------------------
In  sum,  the  comparison  of  Futureplast’s  different  stories  of   success   and   failure   in
technology development suggests the existence of a self-reinforcing cycle driving  entrepreneurial
learning (see figure 2). This virtuous circle is sustained  by  the  growing  allocation  of  resources,
time and attention to projects perceived as more promising by the entrepreneurs, and results in  the
continuous upgrade of the entrepreneur’s  knowledge  base  and  in  the  gradual  reduction  of  the
causal indeterminacy associated to the task to perform. As some opportunities come to  be  judged
as “more promising” than others, they may receive an increasing amount of resources beneficial to
further refine exploration and learning.  Together with these variables, increasing control over  the
process and increasing capacity to estimate the extent and the likelihood of commercial returns are
the cornerstone on which the process is based.
Besides highlighting the role of  resource  scarcity,  our  emerging  interpretive  framework
provides also partial account of how other specific  conditions  affecting  entrepreneurial  learning
influence the process. Earlier, we observed how exploration – conceived as the purposeful attempt
to reduce the degree of ambiguity surrounding a task  –  is  central  to  entrepreneurial  innovation.
Exploration is also central to our model, in which learning (or the failure of) is represented  as  the
outcome of virtuous (or  vicious)  circles  resulting  in  the  gradual  reduction  (or  persistence)  of
causal indeterminacy about the problems to be solved when moving from an initial  intuition  to  a
fully developed technology  underlying  a  new  product  or  process.  Such  representation  of  the
process is consistent with Kirzner’s observation that entrepreneurship is about the development  of
new means-ends relationships (in other words, other relationships of causality), rather than  at  the
refinement of existing ones.
Finally, our model accounts also for the potential loss of  control  implied  by  the  need  to
rely on outside assistance for critical learning activities. In both cases,  the  help  of  scientists  and
engineers from research centres was needed  as  Mr.  Guzzoletti  lacked  the  competence  and  the
instrumentation required for running parts of the development activity. Yet in one case – the  laser
system – previously accumulated knowledge let Mr. Guzzoletti be an active part of the team  since
the early stages. In the other, lack of competence in optics  and  chemistry  excluded  him  and  his
staff from any real involvement in preliminary research and eventually undermined his confidence
in the potential return of the projects. Possession of related knowledge, therefore, may  reduce  the
negative impact on resource commitment (hence on the learning process) of ending up  promoting
a project without feeling able to effectively assess the profile of risk and return.
8. Conclusions
In this paper we have reported findings from a comparative study of factors that promote or hinder
learning processes in entrepreneurial ventures.  We  have  argued  that  entrepreneurial  innovation
rests on a generative learning process  aimed  at  the  development  of  new  knowledge  structures
embodied in  an  innovative  product,  process  or  service.  We  have  observed  how  this  type  of
learning is often the result of a collective process, which is  only  partly  under  the  entrepreneurs’
control. We have pointed out the severe limitation in time, attention and other resources that  often
affect  entrepreneurial  learning,   imposing   periodic   choices   about   the   continuation   or   the
termination of developmental efforts.
In  order  to  explore  factors  affecting  learning  in  entrepreneurial  innovation,  we   have
analyzed two technology development processes within the same company. The comparison  of  a
successful project and an unsuccessful  one  allowed  us  to  investigate  the  underlying  cognitive
processes on the basis of rich, qualitative data. Our study, on the  other  hand,  suffers  from  some
limitations associated to its qualitative nature. While our focused longitudinal  approach  produced
insight into the causal texture of the learning process, the boundaries of its validity are, by its  own
nature, limited. Our research setting was  a  specific  type  of  venture:  a  small,  autonomous,  but
established entrepreneurial firm. While the  distinctive  features  of  the  learning  context  that  we
have  identified  seem  to  apply  to  other  types  of  venture  like  start-ups  or  internal   corporate
ventures, we cannot exclude that  other  traits,  specific  to  these  forms,  may  affect  the  learning
process in a different way. Furthermore, what we have studied is not the only type of learning that
takes place in entrepreneurial ventures. Minniti and Bygrave (2001), for instance, investigate  how
entrepreneurs learn “how  to  be  entrepreneurial”.  Other  important  learning  processes  occur  as
entrepreneurs start exploiting their innovations and managing growth. This, however, was not  the
focus of our study.
We believe, however,  that  the  relevance  of  the  study  should  not  be  judged  from  the
generalizability of our findings, but on the insights that it generates in  a  relatively  underexplored
field such as entrepreneurial learning.  The  emerging  framework  extends  previous  literature  on
knowledge creation and technology  development  in  entrepreneurial  ventures,  as  it  attempts  to
unpack the underlying process of generative  learning.  Evidence  from  the  analysis  suggests,  in
fact, that success and failure of  development  processes  in  Futureplast  rested  on  a  virtuous  (or
vicious)  circle  that  brought  Mr.  Guzzoletti  to  dedicate  more  and  more  time,   attention   and
resources to one project at the expense of the  other.  The  self-reinforcement  of  the  reduction  in
perceived causal indeterminacy, the upgrading in the personal knowledge base, and the  increasing
control of the process increased the entrepreneur’s capacity to assess the commercial return of  the
time and resources dedicated to the project. The increasing clarity of the  potential  “return  on  the
learning investment” and the systematic respect of budgets, timetables, and  milestones  reinforced
Guzzoletti’s commitment and confidence in the successful completion of the process, affecting the
flow of resources between the  projects.  This  fundamental  difference  ultimately  seems  to  have
determined the different outcome of the two projects.
What emerges from our study  is  also  a  representation  of  risk  taking  in  entrepreneurial
innovation that differs from what seems to be largely accepted in the literature.  Most  research  on
risk  taking  (e.g.  Simon,  Houghton  and  Aquino,  1999;  Forlani   and   Mullins,   2000;   Simon,
Houghton and Savelli, 2003) seems to implicitly conceptualize (and study) risk  taking  as  a  one-
time decision. Evidence from our study, instead  suggests  a  view  of  risk  taking  as  an  ongoing
process  subject  to  periodic  revision.  While  Mr.  Guzzoletti  initially  committed  parts   of   his
resources to both projects, his decisions were later revised following  the  flow  of  events  and  his
personal assessment of the situation. Past research on risk taking (e.g. Sitkin and Pablo, 1992)  has
observed a positive relationship between past experience and risk  perception.  The  adoption  of  a
longitudinal perspective brought  to  the  surface  the  relationships  between  risk  taking  and  the
current flow of experience, and helped us capture the connections between escalating commitment
to a course of action and the underlying sensemaking process.
Finally, our findings may increase our understanding of the  relationships  between  human
capital and entrepreneurial activity. A recent study of Swedish  nascent  entrepreneurs  (Davidsson
and Honig, 2003) observed how formal education positively  affects  opportunity  recognition  but
cannot significantly discriminate between successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurial process.  In
other words, previously held knowledge did not significantly affect the  successful  completion  of
entrepreneurial projects. Insights from our study suggest that these results  may  be  affected  by  a
discrepancy between formal education and the actual requirements of the  projects.  In  fact,  while
prior knowledge about the lighting industry helped Mr. Guzzoletti identify the  plastic  cable  as  a
valuable  business  opportunity,  lack  of  competence  about   optics   and   chemistry   may   have
eventually led to the unsuccessful termination of the project.  In  this  respect,  evidence  from  our
study suggests that the relationships between formal education and  the  successful  completion  of
entrepreneurial projects may be mediated by the congruence between previously  held  knowledge
and the specific  requirements  of  the  project.  Future  research  may  benefit  from  more  refined
measurement of educational background of entrepreneurs and the characteristics of the undertaken
projects. 
Our findings may have also important implications  for  the  practice  of  entrepreneurship.
Past  research  indicates  that  the  entrepreneurs’  knowledge  base  may  affect  their  capacity   to
recognize valuable opportunities (Shane, 2000; Simon, Houghton and Savelli, 2003). Our findings
suggest that prior related  knowledge  may  also  affect  the  capacity  to  evaluate  and  exploit  an
opportunity and  to  develop  an  idea  into  a  fully-fledged  new  product  or  service.  Indeed,  the
experience of  Futureplast  shows  the  importance  of  mastering  the  technological  platforms  on
which the  development  of  new  products  rests.  In  the  absence  of  a  related  knowledge  base,
entrepreneurs may be forced to rely on outside assistance  for  the  evaluation  of  the  opportunity,
and eventually to abdicate their  leading  role  in  the  development  process,  gradually  losing  the
capacity to assess the levels of risk and return associated to the completion of the project.  In  sum,
our findings seem to discourage from initiating explorative venture whose technological platforms
are distant from the entrepreneurs’ core technological and scientific domains.
Finally, we believe that our findings may be applied even to the broader case  of  corporate
venturing, as they  may  improve  our  understanding  of  the  implications  of  managing  multiple
development projects. A dominant framework in the  field  of  corporate  venturing  contends  that
technology development within organizations is the result of the  interplay  of  partly  autonomous
and partly induced development initiatives that compete for limited resources (Burgelman,  1991).
The results of this competition depend on  how  attention,  resources  and  rewards  are  channeled
through the organizational context, and on how initiatives are selected  through  the  determination
of  the  strategic  context  (Burgelman,  1991).  In  this  respect,   our   model   may   increase   our
understanding  of  the  cognitive  mechanisms  that  affect  patterns  of  success  and  failure  as   a
consequence of resource allocation between different  corporate  ventures  (see  Van  de  Ven  and
Polley, 1992; Garud and Van de Ven, 1992).
In  conclusion,  we  are  aware  that  our  findings  address  only  one  of  the   fundamental
requirements of successful technology  development-  i.e.  an  adequate  supply  of  resources  and
support to the project. Further research will be required to shed more light  on  what  actors  really
do with these resources that influences the effectiveness  of  the  project.  Furthermore,  our  study
only marginally addresses the issues raised by  the  collective  nature  of  entrepreneurial  learning.
Future work may investigate in more depth the factors that affect the capacity of  entrepreneurs  to
harness external knowledge-based contributions during the innovation process and to  retain  most
of the benefits of the newly created knowledge.
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Figure 1. The chronology of the two processes
|Time     |Project 1                |Project 2                |Data         |
|         |                         |                         |collection   |
|1996|Feb |                                                   |             |
|    |Mar |Mr. Guzzoletti visits a trade fair in Munich       |             |
|    |Apr |Mr. Guzzoletti hires Mr. Monteverdi                |             |
|    |May |                         |                         |             |
|    |Jun |                         |Research on laser shows  |             |
|    |Jul |                         |                         |             |
|    |Aug |Research on plastic cable|                         |             |
|    |Sep |                         |Mr. Guzzoletti visits a  |             |
|    |    |                         |fair in                  |             |
|    |Oct |                         |Moscow                   |             |
|    |Nov |Search for a partner     |Mr. Guzzoletti meets Mr. |             |
|    |    |                         |Nava                     |             |
|    |Dec |                         |                         |             |
|1997|Jan |                         |                         |             |
|    |Feb |                         |                         |First round  |
|    |    |                         |                         |of           |
|    |Mar |                         |                         |interviews   |
|    |Apr |Preliminary tests (CNR)  |                         |             |
|    |May |                         |                         |             |
|    |Jun |                         |                         |             |
|    |Jul |                         |                         |             |
|    |Aug |Termination of the       |                         |             |
|    |    |project                  |                         |             |
|    |Sep |                         |                         |             |
|    |Oct |                         |                         |             |
|    |Nov |                         |                         |             |
|    |Dec |                         |Renewal of the contract  |             |
|    |    |                         |with CISE                |             |
|1998|Jan |                         |                         |Second round |
|    |    |                         |                         |of           |
|    |Feb |                         |                         |interviews   |
|    |Mar |                         |                         |             |
|    |Apr |                         |                         |             |
|    |May |                         |                         |             |
|    |Jun |                         |                         |             |
|    |Jul |                         |                         |             |
|    |Aug |                         |                         |             |
|    |Sep |                         |                         |             |
|    |Oct |                         |Functioning prototype is |             |
|    |    |                         |ready                    |             |
|    |Nov |                         |                         |Feed back on |
|    |Dec |                         |                         |emerging     |
|    |    |                         |                         |Framework    |
Table 1. Conditions of success and failure in the observed development processes
|PLASTIC CABLE (unsuccessful)              |Laser system (successful)                 |
|HIGHER CAUSAL INDETERMINACY               |LOWER CAUSAL INDETERMINACY                |
|Lower structuration of the problem        |Higher structuration of the problem       |
|Task: reproducing a new material starting |Task: integrating different component     |
|from a sample                             |technologies                              |
|                                          |                                          |
|LACK OF RELATED KNOWLEDGE                 |POSSESSION OF RELATED KNOWLEDGE           |
|Lack of the required scientific knowledge |Extensive review of existing licenses     |
|base (optic, chemistry)                   |Much time dedicated to the acquisition of |
|Few external sources of knowledge         |the fundamental knowledge basis (physics, |
|(patents)                                 |laser technology)                         |
|Little time dedicated to knowledge        |                                          |
|acquisition (optical fibers, light        |HIGH CONTROL OF THE PROCESS               |
|conduction)                               |Research is conducted in in-house         |
|                                          |laboratories                              |
|LOW CONTROL OF THE PROCESS                |Continuous participation to the research  |
|Research is conducted by an external      |and development process; systematic       |
|research lab (CNR)                        |“reverse engineering”                     |
|Occasional visits to the research site    |                                          |
|                                          |INCREASING CONFIDENCE IN COMMERCIAL RETURN|
|INCREASINGLY UNCERTAIN PERCEPTION OF      |                                          |
|RETURN                                    |Key actors share a specific interest and a|
|No material incentive for CNR             |commercial incentive                      |
|Commercial application is uncertain and   |Potential applications get clearer        |
|distant in time                           |overtime                                  |
Figure 2. Entrepreneurial innovation as a self-reinforcing learning process
                                                   -
Commitment                                                                          Perceived uncertainty
(time, attention and resources)                                              of return
-
+                                  Causal indeterminacy                                         -
                            -                                              -
Related knowledge base                                                        Control of the process
                                                     +
------------------------------------
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